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1416 Reviews of Books 
ends by showing how, after two years of trial, error, 
and good intentions, Social Democracy returned in 
June 1920 to its traditional, familiar, and therefore 
"safe" prewar stance: political opposition. 
The story, as the author ably shows, is tragic. 
Germany's Socialists inherited the power of govern- 
ment unexpectedly as a result of a revolution not of 
their own making. When the decisive moment ar- 
rived they were split into two parties; worse, they 
were unprepared for the tasks ahead. Neither the 
SPD nor USPD had planned politically for what to 
do if power should fall to them, nor did they possess 
enough qualified persons to fill governmental posts. 
As a result, the two years in power-in which the 
USPD after December 1918 no longer shared- 
were marked by Zerrissenheilt, halfway measures, and 
dubious policies. Divisiveness was everywhere: be- 
tween SPD and USPD, provisional government 
and council movement, Reich government and fed- 
eral states, among others. Although committed to a 
socialist program that predated the war, Social De- 
mocracy in power failed to carry out most of its pro- 
visions, including socialization of industries. To 
govern meant for the SPD in particular to "react to 
national catastrophes" (p. 445); it never welcomed 
power as the fulfillment of a long-desired objective. 
Unpreparedness to deal effectively with foreign 
and domestic crises runs through the account like a 
red thread, and while the author argues con- 
vincingly that extenuating circumstances were re- 
sponsible for failure to handle the former, she comes 
down hard on the SPD's unimpressive record with 
regard to the latter. The party was unprepared for, 
and unable to deal with, the increasing radicalism 
of the masses in the spring and summer of 1919, the 
result of discrepancies between expectations and ac- 
tual achievements of the revolution. These dis- 
crepancies the party failed to eliminate, though it 
had created them by its prewar propaganda and its 
postwar policies. A socialist government that 
evaded socialization and did not impose democrat- 
ization on bureaucracy, judiciary, or the army 
(whose repressive measures against radical workers, 
sanctioned by the SPD, created particular resent- 
ment) was bound to lose credibility. Throughout 
1919 and early 1920 discontented workers flocked 
into the USPD, which, although the "party of pro- 
test" throughout, proved unable to exploit this hu- 
man windfall because it suffered from internal divi- 
sion and indecisive leadership. 
Throughout her book the author has struck an 
admirable balance, both between narrative and in- 
terpretation and in her presentation of achieve- 
ments and shortcomings of Germany's first socialist 
experiment in government. She has visited fifteen 
archives in six countries, and her bibliography of 
published sources as well as her statistical appen- 
dixes are exemplary. While the book offers no star- 
tlingly new discoveries, it is more than a synthesis of 
existing studies in that the author's archival re- 
search adds many new insights to specific aspects of 
the topic. The one weakness, the sketchy presenta- 
tion of relations between SPD and its Weimar Coa- 
lition partners during 1919-20, is a minor flaw in 
view of her overall achievement. 
WERNER T. ANGRESS 
State University of New York, 
Stony Brook 
HERMANN GLASER. The Cultural Roots of National Social- 
Ism. Translated by ERNEST A. MENZE. Austin: Univer- 
sity of Texas Press. 1978. Pp. 289. $12.95. 
Hermann Glaser's well-known polemic, Spiesser-Ideo- 
logie, originally published in 1964, is here translated 
and edited for an American public. In this, as in a 
great many other writings over the last fifteen years, 
Glaser laments the decline of the German in- 
tellectual traditions of the early nineteenth century. 
By 1850 or so, he believes, the ideas of the Classical 
and Romantic periods had come to be misunder- 
stood or emptied of meaning, resulting in philistine 
mediocrity throughout German intellectual life. 
This perversion of ideas into pseudo-ideas is, ac- 
cording to Glaser, central to an understanding of 
National Socialism, a thesis he defends by juxtapos- 
ing, more or less at random, quotations from men as 
diverse in time, status, and talent as Wagner, Rilke, 
Treitschke, Arndt, Wilhelm II, Ernst Jiunger, and, 
of course, Adolf Hitler. Such juxtapositions, the au- 
thor claims, demonstrate the "structural" similar- 
ities between the thought of Hitler and that of vari- 
ous nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writers 
on such subjects as the nation, Jews, sex, family, 
youth, blood, leadership, home town, and so on. 
The author rarely pauses to analyze his quoted ma- 
terials or to discuss their provenance, nor does he 
confront questions of historical development or 
change. The book is, then, a compendium of se- 
lected cliches of literature and public oratory and 
depends for effect not on argument but on reitera- 
tion. It is not history, nor is it intended to be: Glaser 
describes it as an attempt to redefine what is accept- 
able in the German intellectual tradition, so that 
contemporaries may reclaim it "without qualms of 
conscience." But, since Glaser excels in poking fun 
at cliches, not much emerges as acceptable beyond 
what is vaguely described as "German warmth, 
German spirit and German culture" (p. 13). 
Glaser, an official in the education department of 
the City of Nuremberg, is a pithy and popular 
writer. His works, which include attacks on the pro- 
vincialism of the right (Kleinstadt-Ideologie [ 19691, 
Der Gartenzwerg in der Boutique [1973]) and on radical 
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youth groups of the left (H. Glaser ed., Jugend-Stil, 
Stil derjugend [1971]), give considerable insight into 
the intellectual and ideological quandaries that 
have faced Germans of the moderate left in the last 
two decades. Ernest A. Menze's introduction dis- 
cusses the book in this light, but the usefulness of 
this edition would have been greatly increased had 
he commented at greater length on the con- 
troversies Glaser's work has aroused-on its context 
and contemporary significance. Glaser's volume is 
of interest to students of current patterns in German 
thought; it is not, despite the unfortunate English 
title, either a serious or significant study of the ori- 
gins of National Socialism. Apart from the title, the 
translation is adequate, but it loses both the shrill 
tone and the pungent vigor of the original. 
BARBARA MIL,LER l.ANE 
Bryn Mawr College 
ULRICH D)UNKER. Der Reichsbund judischer Frontsoldaten, 
1919-1938: Geschichte eines judischen Abwehrvereins. 
Diusseldorf: Droste Verlag. 1977. Pp. 354. DM 48. 
Based on a Free University of Berlin doctoral thesis, 
Ulrich Dunker's book expands the literature of 
twentieth-century Jewish resistance to anti-Semi- 
tism. The Reichsbund judischer Frontsoldaten (RjF), a 
35,000-member "defense league," was the second- 
largest Jewish organization in interwar Germany. 
Less influential than either the larger Centralverein 
deutscher Staatsburger judischer Glaubens (CV) or the 
more activist Zionistiche Vereinig7ung, the RjF's his- 
tory, according to the author, offers new insight into 
the failure of the "German-Jewish symbiosis" (pp. 
9, 185). Because the RjF's archives were destroyed 
by the Nazis, Dunker has searched Reich, Land, and 
municipal records in East and West Germany; testi- 
monies of former members in Israel, North and 
South America; RjF publications; and extensive 
secondary literature. 
Though rooted in the Second Reich, the RjF was 
an outgrowth of the new, more virulent anti-Semi- 
tism of World War I: the Jews, made the scapegoat 
for prolonged war and the blockade, for defeat and 
revolution, were denounced as profiteers, traitors, 
and, especially, for shirking military service. The 
RjF was founded on February 8, 1919, to defend 
the honor of Jewish front soldiers, their right, and 
that of all German Jews, to be accepted as full- 
fledged citizens. It began with fifty-one veterans 
who had been rejected by volkisch servicemen's or- 
ganizations and discouraged by the CV. Stressing 
its German nationalism, the RjF fought the Spar- 
tacists, patrolled Hamburg during Christmas 1920, 
and accompanied the Free Corps in Upper Silesia. 
Led by Reserve Captain Dr. Leo Loewenstein, by 
1925 it grew to five hundred local and sixteen re- 
gional organizations, with a national assembly and 
twelve-member governing board, consisting of at- 
torneys, professors, a journalist, and one estate 
owner. Its newspaper, Der Schild, preached com- 
radeship, courage, and austerity. 
Dunker divides RjF defense tactics into the 
"deed" and the "word." During the November 
1923 attacks on Berlin Jews (triggered by agitators 
as well as inflation and unemployment), the RjF 
armed, protected synagogues, and fought the assail- 
ants. It promoted self-defense through sports, box- 
ing, and gymnastic societies, sponsored agricultural 
settlements, and led patriotic demonstrations. 
When anti-Semitic incidents mounted through the 
"prosperity years" 1925-28, it joined the secret, 
paramilitaryJudischer Abwehr Dienst (JAD). 
Its propaganda (Au]klarungsarbeit) aimed at dis- 
arming anti-Semitism with facts, cited the war rec- 
ord to prove that Jews were neither cowardly nor 
"unproductive." The RjF published books, trained 
speakers, and printed posters with volkisch language 
and iconography, including an "Appeal to German 
Mothers." Its most ambitious venture was a 1932 
list of ten thousand Jewish war dead. An "unpoli- 
tical" organization that shunned Jewish affairs (es- 
pecially Zionism) and confined itself to opposing 
anti-Semitism, it developed no strategy to halt Naz- 
ism's spread or to defend the Weimar Republic. 
After Hitler seized power, the RjF grew, reorgan- 
ized into an authoritarian structure, and publicly 
supported the regime. Its early, spectacular tri- 
umph-Jewish veterans were exempted from re- 
moval from the Civil Service-was nullified by the 
Nuremberg laws. Its raison d'etre evaporated when 
all Jews were excluded from the Wehrmnacht. Trans- 
formed from ardent nationalists to persecuted Jews, 
RjF refugees were aided by Zionists and by English- 
Jewish servicemen's groups. Banned by the Ge- 
stapo, the RjF ended at Kristallnacht, when resisters 
disappeared into concentration camps. 
Dunker balances criticisms of the RjF's elitist and 
defensive tactics under Weimar and its doomed op- 
portunism under Hitler with the assertion that its 
basic aims were shared by many German Jews, 
even after 1933. Yet, the average RjF member re- 
mains a stereotype: had he other loyalties that occa- 
sionally conflicted with the organization's ideal. 
How did he compare with his French, English, or 
American counterpart? Dunker concludes that the 
RjF's ultimate assimilationist goal might have suc- 
ceeded in "more tranquil times" except for the 
"unique historical process" that brought Hitler to 
power (p. 185), but his evidence suggests a more 
pessimistic conclusion. 
CAROLE FINK 
University of North Carolina, 
Wilmington 
